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In the early and mid-1970's, the nation found itself in what has been
called a medical malpractice crisis.' The number of medical malpractice
claims was escalating, as was the dollar amount of judgments being
awarded by juries to successful malpractice plaintiffs. A general
dissatisfaction with the traditional methods of determining medical
malpractice claims through the use of jury trials was evident, at least
among health care providers and malpractice insurance carriers.
Malpractice insurance premiums were skyrocketing and insurance car-
riers were becoming increasingly reluctant to risk coverage of physi-
cians. The rise in insurance premiums and the carriers' reluctance to
continue to provide adequate coverage led to the fears that physicians
would accelerate the practice of "defensive medicine" or that some
would cease to practice altogether.
In response to the "crisis," in an effort to provide medical malprac-
tice insurance to health care providers at a reasonable cost and yet to
EDITOR'S NOTE: The author is Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England Col-
lege School of Law. B.A., Gettysburg College (1972); J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center (1977); LL.M., Yale Law School (1981); formerly law clerk to the Honorable Robert
Lee Jacobs, President Judge (retired), Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and chief law clerk
to the Honorable John A. MacPhail, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The author
wishes to acknowledge Professor Peter H. Schuck of the Yale Law School for reading and
commenting upon a draft of this article and Jane E. Kessel for providing excellent clerical
assistance in preparing the article. The author assumes all responsibility, however, for the
article's contents.
1. See, e.g., Berkman, Self-Insurance of Hospital Malpractice Liability: A Dissection
of Pennsylvania Act 111 and State and Federal Regulations, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 158, 158-62
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Berkman].
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provide adequate remedies for the victims of medical malpractice,
many state legislatures sought alternatives to traditional malpractice
litigation. The legislation proposed and adopted in many jurisdictions
took various forms: some mandated nonbinding arbitration between a
patient and health care provider involved in a malpractice dispute;
some permitted the parties to sign a pre-treatment contract providing
that any malpractice dispute arising between them would be submitted
to arbitration; other legislation established panels to review medical
malpractice claims either prior to the filing of such an action in a court
of law or subsequent to such a filing but before the case actually reached
the trial stage. The objectives of the various alternatives were similar.
The drafters of the legislation hoped that such procedures would
eliminate frivolous malpractice claims without the involvement of
precious court resources, that many meritorious suits would be settled
without the use of the courts, and that patients and health care pro-
viders would receive more just remedies, more expeditiously, than
they had received pursuant to traditional malpractice litigation.
Some form of malpractice litigation alternative has been adopted in
more than thirty states.2 The purpose of this article is to review the
various alternatives enacted and to attempt to assess the effectiveness
of the states' response to the malpractice "crisis." Because most of the
statutory provisions vary widely, some limits must be imposed on this
review. This article will focus primarily on the arbitration or review
panel aspects of the alternatives-the form of the panel (that is, ar-
bitration or medical review panel), the composition of the reviewing
2. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (Supp. 1957-1980); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West Supp. 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6801-6871 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44 (West 1980); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 671-11 to -20 (1976 & Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1001 to -1013 (1979 &
Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 201-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§
16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. §§ 65-4901 to -4909 (1980); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299:47 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. §§ 24-2701 to -2715 (Supp.
1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1980 & Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040 -
.5065 (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 538.010 - .080 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN
§§ 27-6-101 to -704 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801, 44-2840 to -2847 (1978); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 41A.010 - .095 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 519-A:1 to :10 (1974); N.J. RULES §§
4:12-1 to -7 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to -28 (1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKin-
ney Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.1-01 to -10 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2711.21 to 24 (Page Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-.1006 (Purdon Supp.
1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to -10 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25B-1
to -26 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-101 to -121 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§
7001-7008 (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.1 to .12:2 (1977 & Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 655.001-.27 (West 1980 & Supp. 1980). The constitutionality of a number of these
statutes has been challenged in the federal and state courts. See generally note 52 infra,
for a review of the decisions in a number of those cases.
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body, the nature of the hearing granted the parties in the proceeding,
the decision rendered by the board or panel, and the availability of an
appeal following the initial panel decision. The reader should be aware
that many malpractice statutes, in keeping with the legislative pur-
poses of containing the amount of judgment a malpractice claimant
may receive and the amount of malpractice insurance premiums health
care providers must pay, place upper limits on such judgments and
make provisions for adequate malpractice coverage for health care pro-
viders. Many statutes also prescribe in detail the procedures to be
followed in filing complaints, performing discovery, and otherwise con-
ducting malpractice actions within the alternative dispute resolution
systems. While recognizing the importance of all of these provisions to
the effectiveness of the various malpractice statutes, it is not the pur-
pose of this article to discuss or analyze them apart from any effect
they may have on the actual operation of the system.
The article, then, has two primary foci. The first is Pennsylvania's
Health Care Services Malpractice Act.3 The Pennsylvania Act went into
effect on January 15, 1976 and provided a mandatory nonbinding ar-
bitration system for malpractice dispute resolution. It operated in that
form until September 22, 1980 when it was declared unconstitutional
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mattos v. Thompson.' Part II of
this article sets forth a discussion of the Pennsylvania Act as it existed
between 1976 and 1980, the relevant litigation which surrounded it, the
ultimate holding of unconstitutionality, and the results effected by its
operation. The remainder of the article is devoted to an examination of
alternatives the Pennsylvania legislature may now consider in adopt-
ing a new medical malpractice litigation alternative. Each of the three
alternatives -arbitration similar to that declared unconstitutional in
Pennsylvania, contractual agreement to arbitrate, and medical panel
review-will be discussed in the context of jurisdictions in which the
specific alternatives are currently in operation. Part III of this article
focuses on the arbitration system used in Maryland; Part IV discusses
the contractual agreements provided in Michigan; and Part V analyzes
medical review panels as they exist in Tennessee. In all instances,
reference is made to other jurisdictions which differ significantly and
importantly from those being discussed. Finally, results achieved pur-
suant to the various alternatives, in terms of claims filed and resolved,
settlement amounts, etc., are set forth.' Part VI of the article contains
a general conclusion.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101 -.1006 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
4. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
5. The author is indebted to Walter R. Tabler, Director, Health Claims Arbitration
Office, State of Maryland; John A. lannelli, Administrative Assistant to the Commissioner
of Insurance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Nancy A. Baerwaldt, Commissioner of In-
410 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 19:407
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH CARE SERVICES MALPRACTICE ACT
The Pennsylvania Health Care Services Malpractice Act was
enacted with the purpose, inter alia, of establishing "a system through
which a person who has sustained injury or death as a result of tort or
breach of contract by a health care provider can obtain a prompt deter-
mination and adjudication of his claim and the determination of fair
and reasonable compensation."6 The Act provided for the creation of a
system of arbitration panels for health care,7 to be headed by an Ad-
ministrator.8 The legislature mandated that the panels would have:
original exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide any claim brought by a
patient or his representative for loss or damages resulting from the fur-
nishing of medical services which were or which should have been provid-
ed. [The Act also provided that the arbitration panel would] have original
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide any claim asserted against a
nonhealth care provider who is made a party defendant with a health care
provider.9
In other words, any patient instituting a medical malpractice action
against a health care provider was required to submit the claim to ar-
bitration rather than proceeding by way of traditional civil litigation.
Upon the filing of a medical malpractice claim with the Ad-
ministrator, the parties were to be given the opportunity to choose a
seven member arbitration panel consisting of two attorneys, two
health care providers, and three lay persons. Selection of the ar-
bitrators was to be made from lists made available to the parties by
the Administrator." The composition of the seven member panels and
the actual selection of the arbitrators caused grave problems for the
surance, Randy Watkins, Coordinator of the Medical Arbitration Program for the In-
surance Bureau, and Michael Arford, Director, Michigan Medical Arbitration and Health
Services, American Arbitration Association, State of Michigan; The Honorable Joseph F.
Gagliardi, Administrative Judge of the Ninth Judicial District, State of New York, and
Chairman of New York's Ad Hoc Committee on Medical Malpractice Panels, and Francis
Zarro, Executive Assistant to Justice Gagliardi; R. Peter Ericson, Executive Deputy Ad-
ministrator, Arbitration Panels for Health Care, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and an
anonymous source from the State of Tennessee, all of whom provided valuable informa-
tion on the operation and results of medical malpractice litigation alternatives in their
respective states. All interpretation and analysis in this article of the information provid-
ed by the above-named persons, however, is the sole responsibility of the author and may
not necessarily reflect the beliefs or philosophies of those persons.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.102 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
7. Id. § 1301.308(a).
8. Id. § 1301.301.
9. Id. § 1301.309. But see Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980), in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared this section unconstitutional. See notes 65-77 and
accompanying text infra.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981) (amended 1979).
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arbitration system. As noted in the Administrator's Fourth Annual
Report on the Operation of the Arbitration Panels for Health Care, in
most cases the parties were unable to agree on a seven member
panel." In one instance, the panel selection process alone lasted sixteen
months."' In reality, the parties usually agreed to forego a seven
member panel, stipulating instead to arbitration before a five or three
member panel, and, in many instances, panel selection was accomplished
not by the parties but by the Administrator. 3 In response to such
difficulties and in response to a recommendation by the Administrator,
the legislature in 1979 amended the original Act and provided that the
panels would be composed of three members: one attorney, who would
be designated the chairperson; one health care provider; and one lay
person who was neither a health care provider nor an attorney-all of
whom would be appointed by the Administrator." The amendment to
the Act became effective on February 12, 1980. In a further effort to
improve the speed with which malpractice claims were resolved, the
1979 amendment also provided that if the Administrator had not
selected a panel within ninety days after the filing of a certificate of
readiness by the parties, the Administrator was to transfer the action
to a court of common pleas having venue over the case for pretrial and
trial as in any other civil case."'
In cases where arbitration panels were convened to hear malprac-
tice actions, the Act commanded the panels to "expeditiously hear and
determine the claim in accordance with the rules and regulations
adopted by the administrator."'" All proceedings and hearings before
the panel were to be conducted according to the common and statutory
law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the Pennsylvania rules of evidence.1 7 The panel
was permitted, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, to
appoint a disinterested and qualified expert who would examine the
claimant or "relevant evidentiary matter" and who would testify as a
witness concerning the examination. 8 Following the submission of all
evidence and the closing of all matters in the proceeding, the panel
11. Administrator for Arbitration Panels for Health Care, Report of the Fourth Year
of Operation, at 10-11 (Sept. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Annual Report].
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 10-11.
14. Act of December 14, 1979, P.L. 562, (No. 128, § 1, 1979 Pa. Laws 562) (currently
codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.308(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980)).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.403 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
16. Id. § 1301.402.
17. Id § 1301.506.
18. Id. § 1301.507.
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was authorized to make a determination as to liability and to award
damages to the injured party.-9
Appeals from panel determinations were by way of trial de novo to
the Pennsylvania court of common pleas. 0 Where an appeal was taken
to a court of common pleas, the arbitration panel's findings of fact, but
not its award of damages, were admissible into evidence before the
judge or jury trying the matter.2' If no appeal was taken from the
panel's decision, the party prevailing before the panel could request
that the record of the proceedings and the panel's judgment be
transferred to the court of common pleas for execution in the district
where any of the parties resided.'
Most of the litigation surrounding the Pennyslvania Health Care
Services Malpractice Act involved section 309 setting forth the
jurisdiction of the panels and section 502 permitting the joinder of ad-
ditional parties "who may be necessary and proper to a just determina-
tion of the claim" and granting the arbitration panel "jurisdiction over
such additional parties whether they be health care providers or
nonhealth care providers.""
Section 309 questions have arisen primarily in two contexts: where
medical malpractice actions were instituted in federal district courts in
Pennsylvania and where actions were instituted in state courts against
nonhealth care providers who joined health care providers as addi-
tional defendants. The leading federal case involving section 309 of the
Pennsylvania Health Care Services Malpractice Act was Edelson v.
Soricelli24 There, a plaintiff suing a health care provider for malprac-
tice argued that the Act was procedural and not substantive and that
the requirement that the claim be submitted to an. arbitration panel
before instituting suit pursuant to the federal court's diversity
jurisdiction was thus obviated. The plaintiff also argued that the per-
formance of the arbitration system had been so dismal that to impose
the arbitration requirement precluded the full and fair adjudication of
such claims in the federal court. The court held, however, that medical
malpractice plaintiffs were required to submit their claims to malprac-
tice arbitration panels for resolution before invoking the jurisdiction of
the federal court. 5 In Hamilton v. Roth26 a state prisoner instituted a
medical malpractice suit in federal district court arguing that because
his was a pendent jurisdiction and not a diversity jurisdiction case,
19. Id § 1301.508(a)(9).
20. Id. § 1301.509.
21. Id. § 1301.510.
22. Id § 1301.511(a).
23. Id. § 1301.502.
24. 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979).
25. Id. at 141.
26. 624 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1980).
Vol. 19:407
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Edelson v. Soricelli was inapplicable and that he was not required to
first seek relief before an arbitration panel. The court disagreed,
stating that the different jurisdictional basis was irrelevant and that
the plaintiff was indeed required to first pursue his malpractice claim
before an arbitration panel.'
A different outcome was reached by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court when it considered the issue of whether the arbitration panel
had jurisdiction over a trespass action filed by a plaintiff against a
nonhealth care provider defendant who then joined a health care pro-
vider as an additional defendant. In Staub v. Southwest Butler Coun-
ty School District' a student injured in a school physical education
class instituted suit against the school district. The school district, in
turn, joined as defendants the physicians and hospital responsible for
the student's medical treatment alleging that they were responsible
for any injury to the student. In holding that original jurisdiction re-
mained with the court of common pleas in which the suit was in-
stituted, the superior court noted that in terms of nonhealth care pro-
viders section 309 vests original, exclusive jurisdiction with arbitration
panels for health care when a claim is instituted by a patient or pa-
tient representative and the claim is against a nonhealth care provider
who is made a party to the action with a health care provider.' In
Staub, the court noted, the plaintiff made no claim against a health
care provider. The plaintiff chose to litigate her action, the court con-
tinued, in the court of common pleas, and she could not be denied that
choice of forum by a defendant merely by the defendant's joining a
health care provider as an additional defendant." The court recognized
that the defendant tortfeasor was entitled to seek contribution from a
health care provider to the extent that medical negligence caused the
plaintiffs injuries. That right could be adequately protected by joining
the health care provider in the original action before the court of com-
mon pleas. The court acknowledged that such a procedure could result
in the finding of malpractice liability without proceeding before an ar-
bitration panel, but that in the absence of legislation prohibiting such a
procedure, the economics of time and personnel dictated that all of the
issues in the case be resolved in the one action before the court of com-
mon pleas. 1 In the later case of Taglieri v. Logansport Machine Co. 32
the superior court, moreover, concluded that the court of common
27. Id at 1210-12.
28. 263 Pa. Super. Ct. 413, 398 A.2d 204 (1979), aff'd, 489 Pa. 196, 413 A.2d 1082
(1980).
29. Id- at 419, 398 A.2d at 206.
30. Id at 419-20, 398 A.2d at 207.
31. Id. at 420-21, 398 A.2d at 207.
32. 266 Pa. Super. Ct. 458, 405 A.2d 524 (1979).
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pleas will not be deprived of jurisdiction in such an action even
where the plaintiff has simultaneously filed and has pending a medical
malpractice action before an arbitration panel.' A similar decision was
reached by the federal district court in Zielinski v. Zappala,3 where
Taglieri was relied upon in a diversity action in deciding that section
309 does not require a trial court to defer to arbitration where the
allegation of medical malpractice is contained in a third-party claim filed
by a non-patient seeking contribution from a physician.
Litigation arose concerning section 502 of the Act because of the at-
tempt by health care providers to apply its language-"The arbitration
panel shall have jurisdiction over such additional parties whether they
be health care providers or nonhealth care providers" -literally. In a
series of cases, health care providers sued for malpractice attempted
to join as additional defendants the brother of the victim who struck
the victim with a snowball causing the original injury,35 a fraternal
organization operating a lodge where the plaintiff was assaulted before
the alleged negligent medical treatment," and the architect of and
manufacturer of window glass of a hospital psychiatric ward from
which a patient leaped to his death."7 In all three cases, the Ad-
ministrator had refused to allow the health care provider defendants
to join the nonhealth care providers and these decisions were affirmed
by the appellate court. In affirming the Administrator's decisions, the
court reasoned that the legislature never intended that the arbitration
panels would decide any questions other than those involving medical
malpractice and that although section 502 permits the joinder of any
additional party necessary and proper to a determination of the claim
before the panel, the claim intended to be determined was for loss or
damages resulting from medical services.38 In the precedential decision
of Gillette v. Redinger the court first addressed the term "nonhealth
care provider" and determined that the term did not encompass all
persons excluded from the definition of "health care provider," "but
rather was intended to encompass those persons who, like manufac-
turers of drugs or medical instruments ... are kindred to health care
providers."39 Accordingly, the joinder of the party who may have been
33. I& at 460, 405 A.2d at 525.
34. 470 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
35. Gillette v. Redinger, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 469, 383 A.2d 1295 (1978). See text ac-
companying notes 38-42 infra.
36. Sunbury Community Hosp. v. Kuster, 49 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 410 A.2d 409
(1980).
37. Geisinger Medical Center v. Fisher, 50 Pa. Commw. Ct. 578, 413 A.2d 462 (1980).
38. Id. at 582, 413 A.2d at 464-65; Sunbury Community Hosp. v. Kuster, 49 Pa. Commw.
Ct. at 142-43, 410 A.2d at 411; Gillette v. Redinger, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 475, 383 A.2d at
1298.
39. Gillette v. Redinger, 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 474, 383 A.2d at 1298.
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responsible for the initial injury was not necessary to a determination
of whether the health care provider defendant was guilty of malprac-
tice.10 The court noted that the only issue before the panel was the
alleged failure of the health care provider to treat the plaintiffs injury
and that if the question of how the injury occurred was germane to the
malpractice question, the alleged original tortfeasor could be called to
testify without that person's liability being relevant to a panel deci-
sion. 1 To hold otherwise, the court said, would be to vest the panels
with jurisdiction over virtually every type of tort claim contributing,
however remotely, to the plaintiffs injury. The jurisdiction of the
panels over nonhealth care providers was limited, therefore, to those
nonhealth care providers intimately related to the process of fur-
nishing medical services such as manufacturers of drugs or equipment
used by health care providers in administering medical care.2
The case of Firich v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.'3 presents
an interesting twist of the issues presented above concerning sections
309 and 502 of the Act. In Firich the plaintiff sued four nonhealth care
providers/equipment manufacturers on the basis of products liability.
The nonhealth care providers then joined as additional defendants
health care providers allegedly responsible for the plaintiffs injuries.
The federal district court distinguished the decisions reached in Zielin-
ski v. Zappala," Taglieri v. Logansport Machine Co.," and Staub
v. Southwest Butler County School District"' on the basis that in those
cases the original cause of action arose from a set of facts not involv-
ing the delivery of medical services. In Firich, however, the plaintiff
alleged that he was injured by a defective piece of medical equipment
manufactured by the four corporations and that the injury occurred
during the administration of medical services. The original suit, then,
focused on an integral component of a medical procedure.' The Firich
court held, therefore, that a patient filing suit against a nonhealth care
provider, as defined in Gillette" as being subject to arbitration panel
jurisdiction, must file the claim with the panel when the patient can
40. Id at 475, 383 A.2d at 1298.
41. Id- at 475-76, 383 A.2d at 1298.
42. Id at 474, 476; 383 A.2d at 1298. See also Morrison v. Therm-O-Rite Products
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1295 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979).
43. 482 F. Supp. 1043 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
44. 470 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see text accompanying note 34 supra.
45. 266 Pa. Super. Ct. 458, 405 A.2d 524 (1979); see text accompanying notes 32-34
supra.
46. 263 Pa. Super. Ct. 413, 398 A.2d 204 (1979), affd, 489 Pa. 196, 413 A.2d 1082
(1980); see text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
47. 482 F. Supp. at 1051.
48. 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 475, 383 A.2d at 1298; see text accompanying notes 35,
38-42 supra.
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reasonably expect the nonhealth care provider to join a health care
provider as an additional defendant. 9
The original constitutional challenge to the Pennsylvania Health
Care Services Malpractice Act was decided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in 1978 in the case of Parker v. Children's Hospital5 ° The
court held in Parker that the Act was constitutional. Although that
holding has since been overruled by the same court in Mattos v.
Thompson,51 the Parker decision is worthy of discussion here because
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself devoted a large part of its Mat-
tos decision to discussing Parker and because the rationale set forth in
Parker for the constitutionality of the Act is representative of that set
forth by the courts of many jurisdictions in support of the constitu-
tionality of alternative malpractice dispute resolution systems.2
49. 482 F. Supp. at 1053.
50. 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
51. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980); see text accompanying notes 65-73 infra.
52. See, e.g., DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287 (4th
Cir. 1980) (provision of Virginia Medical Malpractice Act permitting admission into
evidence at trial of medical review panel's opinion did not interfere with function of jury;
also, Act's requirement that malpractice plaintiffs but not other tort plaintiffs submit
their complaints to panels as a prerequisite to court action did not constitute a violation of
equal protection rights because the elimination of frivolous claims and the provision and
promotion of mediation and settlement of such claims provides a rational basis aimed at
achieving a legitimate state interest); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.
1979) (Florida Medical Malpractice Law establishing medical review panels does not
burden a plaintiff's right to trial by jury nor does the admissibility of the panel's opinion
at trial invade the province of the jury; also, the law did not violate due process or equal
protection principles). The Woods court did indicate that there could be constitutional pro-
blems involved with a nonconsensual system of arbitration. The constitutionality of the
Florida statute had previously been upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida in Carter v.
Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). The statute was
recently held to be unconstitutional, Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980), on the
basis that the nonextendable 10 month time period in which panel review had to be com-
pleted or the case transferred to a trial court was arbitrary, capricious, and a denial of
due process. The Aidana court stated, however, that its decision reflected that the system
itself was not working well, not that the wisdom expressed by the court in Carter v.
Sparkman had not been correct. Id at 237.
See also Hines v. Elkhart General Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind.), affwd, 603 F.2d
646 (7th Cir. 1979) (Indiana Medical Malpractice Act establishing medical review panels
did not infringe on claimants' right to trial by jury, did not deny them access to the
courts, and did not violate equal protection principles); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576,
570 P.2d 744 (1977) (submission of medical review panel findings to jury does not violate
right to trial by jury and requirement that medical malpractice claimants proceed through
panel system as condition precedent to court action does not violate equal protection prin-
ciples; bond requirement of statute held unconstitutional); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (Nebraska's Hospital Medical Liability Act providing for
medical review panels does not violate due process or equal protection principles, does not
deny malpractice plaintiffs access to the courts, and does not permit the invasion of the
function of the jury merely because the panel's opinion is admissible into evidence before
the jury); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d
Vol. 19:407
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The supreme court began its analysis in Parker with the presump-
tion that the Act was constitutional and placed the burden on the
plaintiffs challenging the Act to prove that it was clearly, palpably,
and plainly unconstitutional.' The plaintiffs' first argument in support
of their contention that the Act was unconstitutional was that it
violated article I, section 6 of the Constitution of Pernnsylvania
guaranteeing them a right to trial by jury. The court conceded that
the right to jury trial was a right to be protected, but that it was not
to be protected to the exclusion of all other methods of dispute resolu-
tion. The court had previously held that the imposition of arbitration
as a condition precedent to litigation did not constitute a per se viola-
tion of article I, section 6.11 Such a prerequisite was valid, the court
continued, so long as the right to trial by jury was available to the par-
ties prior to a final determination of their respective rights and so long
as the right of presenting the issue to be determined to the jury was
not burdened by onerous conditions, restrictions, or regulations which
made the right practically unavailable. 6
696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977) (admissibility of medical review panel's opinion
into evidence does not invade province of jury and New York medical malpractice law
neither violates equal protection or due process principles nor does it deny malpractice
claimants access to the courts); State ex reL Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261
N.W.2d 434 (1978) (Wisconsin medical malpractice act does not constitute an improper
delegation of the judicial function to an administrative body, does not deny access to the
courts to malpractice claimants and does not violate equal protection and due process
rights; submission of medical review panel opinions to the jury does not violate claimants'
right to trial by jury and presence of health care provider on panel does not lead to
assumption of bias on part of panel).
But cf. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976)
(Illinois statute permitting decision of medical review panel composed of physicians and
attorneys to become final determination in certain cases without subsequent court action
constitutes improper delegation of judicial function and impermissible restriction on right
to trial by jury and is unconstitutional); State ex reL Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp.
for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979) (Missouri statute requiring submis-
sion of medical malpractice claims to review board as prerequisite to filing action in court
constitutes violation of Missouri constitutional provision that courts be open to every per-
son and afford a remedy for every injury, and that justice be administered without sale,
denial, or delay; the court indicated that a system by which claims would be referred to
review panels after being filed with a court could possibly withstand a constitutional
challenge); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903
(1976) (Ohio statute requiring arbitration of malpractice actions constitutes unconstitu-
tional infringement on the judicial function, a violation of the right to trial by jury, and a
violation of equal protection and due process rights).
53. 483 Pa. at 116, 394 A.2d at 937.
54. "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate. The
General Assembly may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not
less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case." PA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (amended 1971).
55. Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955).
56. 483 Pa. at 119, 394 A.2d at 939 (quoting Smith Case, 381 Pa. at 231, 112 A.2d at
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The plaintiffs argued, however, that the difficulty and expense in-
volved in trying malpractice cases and the actual result of the arbitra-
tion requirement (that the case, in effect, be tried twice) created an
onerous condition which did make the right to jury trial practically
unavailable. The court adamantly rejected the assumption that the ar-
bitration requirement imposed a two-tiered trial scheme. The purpose
of the Act, the court said, was to provide an expeditious disposition of
malpractice actions and to avoid the delays inherent in the litigation
process. Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion that the Act imposed a
burden on them, the court found that the arbitration system would
provide a swifter adjudication of their claims at a minimal cost. At the
same time, it would guarantee the satisfaction of any judgment obtained
and, through the imposition of costs on any party found by the court to
have prosecuted a capricious or unreasonable appeal, would discourage
frivolous and dilatory appeals. The question, the court said, was not
the curtailment of the right to trial by jury, but merely its postpone-
ment. And, where the reason for that postponement constitutes a com-
pelling state interest and the procedure followed is reasonably designed
to effectuate the desired objective, the resulting delay is not an un-
constitutional encroachment upon the right. The court found that the
state's interest in attempting to streamline and make more efficient
the medical malpractice system in light of the malpractice crisis was a
compelling one and that the procedures it employed were reasonably
designed to effectuate that interest. Accordingly, the court held that
the medical malpractice arbitration system did not unconstitutionally
infringe upon the plaintiffs' right to trial by jury in medical malprac-
tice actions. 7
The plaintiffs also argued that statistics proved that the arbitration
system was not achieving its intended goal in that medical malpractice
cases were not being resolved more quickly and efficiently than they
would have been pursuant to a traditional litigation system. The
court rejected this argument as well, stating that the time period
covered by the statistics was too short to conclude that the legislative
scheme was incapable of achieving its stated purpose or that the
system's administrator was unable or unwilling to administer the
system in a way that would insure a prompt and fair resolution.
Deference to a coequal branch of government, the court stated, re-
quired that it allow a reasonable period of time to test the effec-
tiveness of the legislation. 9
57. 483 Pa. at 119-21, 394 A.2d at 939-40.
58. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Larsen stated that as of August 31, 1978, 1,270
cases had been filed with the arbitration panels for health care and only 2 had been
resolved. 483 Pa. at 132, 394 A.2d at 945 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
59. 483 Pa. at 121, 394 A.2d at 940.
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The trial court in Parker had held unconstitutional section 510 of
the Act which permitted the parties at a de novo trial to introduce into
evidence the opinion of the arbitration panel. The supreme court
reversed the trial court on that point. Section 510, the court said, did
not transform the opinion into a presumption, nor did it shift the
burden of going forward with evidence or the ultimate burden of proof.
Despite section 510, the judge or jury remained the final arbiter of the
facts and the issues raised and presented. The court rejected the plain-
tiffs' argument that the admission of the panel's opinion would have a
coercive effect on the jury and, accordingly, held the section to be con-
stitutional."0
The plaintiffs also argued that the Act violated article V of the Con-
stitution of Pennsylvania61 by vesting judicial power in an arbitration
panel and by delegating a judicial function to the Administrator. The
court said that the legislature in enacting the Health Care Services
Malpractice Act did not remove a traditional judicial function from the
judiciary. Rather, it merely added a new administrative remedy. The
exercise of adjudicative functions by adminstrative bodies does not
result in the withdrawal of judicial functions contrary to the doctrine
of separation of powers. The legislature neither infringed upon nor set
aside any judicial powers in creating the office of Administrator or the
panels and the full judicial rights of the parties remained intact
through their right to take an appeal to a trial de novo from the
panel's decision.62
The plaintiffs next argued that the inclusion of health care providers
on the arbitration panels constituted an impermissible bias and conflict
of interest. The court disagreed and noted, inter alia, that the health
care providers constituted only a minority of the panel members, that
the plaintiffs asserted no facts to support their allegation of bias, and
that the rules and laws applied by the panel members were derived
from the judge-made common law of Pennsylvania and not from any
persons pecuniarily interested in the outcome of the cases before the
panels. Furthermore, the court refused to presume that health care
providers sitting on the arbitration panels would ignore the facts and
the law applicable to the cases before them.'
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Ad-
ministrator's appointing of the panel and the panel chairperson's tak-
60. I& at 121-25, 394 A.2d at 940-42.
61. Article V vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth "in a unified judicial
system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court,
courts of common pleas ... [and] such other courts as may be provided by law .... PA.
CONST. art. V, § 1.
62. 483 Pa. at 125-27, 394 A.2d at 942-43.
63. Id. at 128-30, 394 A.2d at 943-44.
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ing part in panel deliberations after instructing the panel in the law
applicable to the case were unconstitutional acts.84
By the time the Act was again challenged on constitutional grounds
in Mattos v. Thompson," the patience of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had expired. The court was unwilling to defer any longer to the
coequal branch of government in according further time to test the ef-
fectiveness of the legislation. After once again rejecting the argument
that the arbitration panel system denies medical malpractice victims
procedural due process because of the presence of a physician on the
panel,"' and after reviewing its previous decision in Parker v.
Children's Hospital,"7 the court went on to discuss the actual results of
the medical malpractice arbitration system, results that culminated in
the finding of unconstitutionality.
The facts, as found by the commonwealth court and as adopted by
the supreme court, were startling: Between April 6, 1976 and
December 31, 1979, 2,909 medical malpractice claims had been filed
with the Administrator; of these, a certificate of readiness had been filed
in only 134 cases. Of the 134 cases, 14 had been tried before arbitra-
tion panels, 23 had been settled during panel selection, 1 had been con-
tinued, and 96 were still awaiting disposition. Of the 96 unresolved
cases, arbitration hearings had been scheduled in 7, prehearings had
been scheduled or held in 12, panel selection was underway in 54, and
panel selection had been completed in 23. Of the total 2,909 cases, 698
had been disposed of by means of dismissal, transfer to courts of com-
mon pleas, discontinuance, settlement, or non pros." The court went on
to add that the system had not improved since the commonwealth
court had made its findings of fact: As of May 31, 1980, a total of 3,452
cases had been filed with the Administrator and only 936 had been
resolved, settled, or terminated. Seventy-three percent of all cases filed
pursuant to the arbitration system remained unresolved at that time
64. Id. at 130-31, 394 A.2d at 944-45.
65. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
66. Id at 191-92.
67. Id. at 192-94.
68. Id at 194. Although not directly relevant to the efficiency and effectiveness of
the malpractice arbitration system, it is interesting to note that of the 14 cases tried by
the panels, 13 resulted in verdicts, 8 for the plaintiff and 5 for the defendant, and 1 was
settled. Of the 13 verdicts, by December 31, 1979, 6 had been appealed to the courts of
common pleas and the appeal period for a seventh was still pending. One of the cases ap-
pealed had been decided by a court of common pleas and the verdict reached was the
same as rendered by the arbitration panel. Of the 698 cases which had been resolved, 395
had been settled with disclosure of the amount of settlement, 9 were settled without
disclosure of the amount of settlement, 146 were discontinued without a monetary settle-
ment, 15 had been dismissed, 76 were discontinued by issue of non pros, and 57 had been
transferred to courts of common pleas. Id.
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and 6 of the original 48 cases filed during the system's first year of
operation (1976) had not yet been resolved. 9
Finding that sufficient time had passed from the inception of the ar-
bitration system to allow for a meaningful evaluation of its perform-
ance, the court concluded:
Such delays are unconscionable and irreparably rip the fabric of public
confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial system. Most
importantly, these statistics amply demonstrate that "the legislative
scheme is incapable of achieving its stated purpose." [Citing Parker.]
We are compelled, therefore, to declare unconstitutional section 309 of
the Act, 40 P.S. § 1301.309, giving the health care arbitration panels
"original exclusive jurisdiction" over medical malpractice claims because
the delays involved in processing these claims under the prescribed pro-
cedures set up under the Act result in an oppressive delay and imper-
missibly infringes [sic] upon the constitutional right to a jury."'
The court went on to add that its holding should not be interpreted as
a retreat from its "long-held belief' in arbitration as a viable method of
dispute resolution. Instead, the holding "merely indicates the inability
of this statutory scheme to provide an effective alternative dispute
resolution forum in the area of medical malpractice.""'
Because the court held unconstitutional only section 309 of the Act
conferring original exclusive jurisdiction of medical malpractice cases
on the arbitration panels, questions arose as to the viability of the re-
mainder of the Act. In an opinion issued to the Administrator for Ar-
bitration Panels for Health Care, the Attorney General of Penn-
sylvania stated that the Act, with the exception of section 309, remained
intact 2 and that the arbitration system was merely transformed from
an involuntary one to one which is voluntary and nonbinding in
nature."3 The Attorney General also concluded that because the
supreme court invalidated section 309 on the basis that it imposed an
impermissible infringement on the right to trial by jury and because
defendants as well as plaintiffs are entitled to trial by jury, plaintiffs
could not have the option of proceeding with voluntary arbitration
under the Act without the consent of all defendants and all additional
69. Id. at 195.
70. Id. at 195-96.
71. Id. at 196.
72. Att'y Gen. Official Op. No. 80-2 (Oct. 14, 1980), reprinted in 10 Pa. Bull. 4279 (Nov.
1, 1980). The Attorney General based his conclusion on the language of the majority opin-
ion in Mattos v. Thompson, the separate opinion by Mr. Justice Larsen who dissented in
part because the majority refused to invalidate the entire arbitration scheme, the
severability clause of the Act, and the severability clause of Pennsylvania's Statutory
Construction Act, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1925 (Purdon Supp. Pamp. 1964-1979). 10 Pa.
Bull. at 4280.
73. 10 Pa. Bull. at 4280.
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defendants; to do otherwise, the Attorney General reasoned, would be
to compel defendants to accept an "oppressive delay" in derogation of
their right to trial by jury.74 The Attorney General instructed the Ad-
ministrator, then, that he and the arbitration panels could continue to
accept and docket new complaints, decide motions, hold hearings, and
render decisions on new or presently pending cases only with the con-
sent of all parties to the action. If any party refused such consent, the
case must be transferred to the appropriate court of common pleas.
7 5
The Administrator was also instructed to notify by mail all parties in-
volved in actions before the Administrator and panels of the Attorney
General's interpretation of the system as a voluntary, nonbinding one
and of the option to submit to arbitration under the Act. The parties
were also to be advised that if they failed to respond withholding their
consent, such consent to voluntary arbitration would be presumed." By
January 31, 1981, of the 2,514 cases pending before the arbitration
panels, 2,157 had been transferred to Pennsylvania courts of common
pleas and 357 remained with the panels.
Despite the obvious failings of the medical malpractice arbitration
system in Pennsylvania and the supreme court's decision holding the
Act to be unconstitutional in part, a word must be said by way of ex-
planation of, if not excuse for, the operation of the system. Of those
2,909 cases which had been filed with the arbitration panels by
December 31, 1979, 1,273, or 43.8 percent had been filed within 1979
itself. By September 30, 1980, a total of 3,925 cases had been filed with
the panels with 1,016, or 25.9 percent of the total having been filed in
1980.7 By September 30, 1980, the number of cases having been disposed
of by panel decision had risen from 14 to 56 and, by that date, 120
more cases were pending for panel decision. Following the filing of a
certificate of readiness, 35 percent of all cases were settled by the par-
ties prior to a panel hearing. Fifty percent of the cases were appealed
to courts of common pleas following a panel decision."
According to the Executive Deputy Administrator for Arbitration




77. Lewis, Medical Malpractice Arbitration. Dead or Alive, 52 PA. B.A.Q. 111 (1981).
These figures support the prediction made by the Executive Deputy Administrator of the
Arbitration Panels for Health Care that following transition of the arbitration system to a
voluntary basis, "We do not believe that many litigants will avail themselves of our ser-
vices under these circumstances." Letter from R. Peter Ericson to the author (November
7, 1980).
78. Mr. Ericson's answers to a questionnaire submitted to him by the author
[hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Questionnaire Response].
79. Id.
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primarily by counsel."80 Since panel selection does not begin until
counsel files a certificate of readiness in a case, it is important to note
that in the 3,925 cases filed with the system by September 30, 1980,
counsel had filed only 277 certificates of readiness. 1 Steps have been
taken to alleviate the delay. As noted earlier,82 panel membership has
been cut from seven to three and the method of selecting panel
members has been streamlined. A new rule has also been promulgated
that became effective on February 12, 1980, requiring certificates of
readiness to be filed within one year of the date on which a claim is in-
itially filed.' In the opinion of the Executive Deputy Administrator,
"The system does work well and expeditiously for those who actively
pursue their claims."" It should also be noted that the Administrator's
office handles up to 200 claims each month, faster than the courts of
common pleas. 5 Finally, the system is entirely self-supporting, being
financed by fees levied against health care providers, and has ended
each operating year with a surplus."
Whether the Pennsylvania Arbitration Panels for Health Care would
have begun to operate more effectively and expeditiously under the
Act's new provisions and accompanying regulations is no longer a rele-
80. Id-
81. Id.
82. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
83. The newly promulgated regulation provides:
In all actions commenced prior to the effective date of this section, the parties shall
file a certificate of readiness within one year after the effective date of this section.
In all actions commenced on or after the effective date of this section, the parties
shall file a certificate of readiness within one year after the commencement of the
action.
37 PA. CODE 171.123(a) (1980); see Justice Roberts' dissent in Mattos v. Thompson, 421
A.2d at 198 (Roberts, J., dissenting), where he deemed this adjustment to the Malpractice
Act the most significant. The other modifications mentioned by Justice Roberts were the
reduction in size of the panels from seven to three, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 308(b) (Purdon
Supp. 1980-1981); the elimination of the "strike list" method of selecting panel members
and the substitution of Administrator-appointments instead, id. § 308(a); and the reduction
of parties' peremptory challenges from six to one, id. § 308(c). 421 A.2d at 198 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
Pursuant to Mattos v. Thompson and the Attorney General's official opinion No. 80-2,
reprinted in 10 Pa. Bull. 4279 (Nov. 1, 1980), see note 72 supra, several new rules and
regulations have been promulgated amending 37 PA. CODE §§ 171.6, .7, .8, .155, They
became effective upon publication in 11 Pa. Bull. 407 (Jan. 24, 1981). These additions pro-
vide a procedure for parties to consent to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Panels for
Health Care and procedures for the parties to stipulate to waive their rights to request a
trial de novo following the decision of an arbitration panel so that finality in the arbitra-
tion system will be promoted. Id.
84. Pennsylvania Questionnaire Response, supra note 78.
85. I&
86. Id. See also Fourth Annual Report, supra note 11, at 2-3.
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vant point, however. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has changed
the system from one of involuntary to one of voluntary nonbinding ar-
bitration. There are grave doubts concerning whether many litigants
will avail themselves of the system. What is more likely is that the
Pennsylvania legislature will now search for another alternative to
traditional malpractice litigation. The remainder of this article will
focus on the alternatives currently available to Pennsylvania and on
the likelihood that any of these alternatives will serve the legislative
objective of providing swift, fair justice to medical malpractice
claimants and health care providers involved in malpractice litigation.
III. MANDATORY NONBINDING ARBITRATION
Perhaps the most obvious medical malpractice litigation alternative
available to the Pennsylvania legislature is a system of mandatory ar-
bitration which would withstand a constitutional challenge. Such an
alternative is operative in Maryland87 and has withstood a constitu-
tional attack."
In Maryland,
All claims, suits, and actions, including cross claims, [and] third-party
claims ... by a person against a health care provider for medical injury
allegedly suffered by the person in which damages of more than $5,000
are sought are subject to and shall be governed by the provisions of this
subtitle. An action or suit of that type may not be brought or pursued in
any court of this State except in accordance with this subtitle."
Subject to a jurisdictional limit of $5,000, then, all medical malpractice
claims arising in the State of Maryland must be pursued through ar-
bitration prior to the institution of court action on the matter. The ar-
bitration requirement has also been held to be applicable to malprac-
tice cases brought under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts
sitting in Maryland."
Once a medical malpractice claim is filed with the Director of the
Health Claims Arbitration Office, a three member panel is chosen by
the parties and the Director from lists of qualified persons maintained
by the Director." The panel consists of one attorney, who serves as the
panel chairperson;"5 one health care provider, preferably from the
specialty of the health care provider/defendant; and one member of the
87. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1980 & Supp. 1980).
88. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978).
89. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-02 (1980).
90. Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978), affld 617 F.2d 361
(4th Cir. 1980).
91. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-03(c), -04(b)-(d) (1980).
92. Id § 3-2A-05(c).
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general public who is not an attorney, health care provider, or agent or
employee of an insurance company.93 The parties may agree to submit
their case to a single arbitrator.94 In any event, in the absence of a
showing of malice or bad faith, each arbitrator is immune from suit for
any act or decision made during his or her tenure as an arbitrator and
within the scope of his or her designated authority."
The arbitrators are charged with the responsibility of deciding all
issues of fact and law raised by the complaint and response." The
panel first determines whether or not the health care provider is liable
to the claimant.97 If a finding of liability is made, the panel then con-
siders, assesses, and apportions appropriate damages against one or
more of the health care providers found to be liable.98 The panel's
authority to assess damages is not limited to compensatory damages,
but includes punitive damages as well. Therefore, merely because a
claimant seeks punitive damages, he or she is not excused from the ar-
bitration requirement and must proceed through arbitration before
presenting the matter to a court for resolution."
Following a decision by the panel, if no party rejects the decision
within ninety days of its being served on the parties or within thirty
days of its being modified by the panel, it becomes final and binding on
the parties.00 If any party does reject the panel's decision, he or she
must file a notice of rejection with the Director and the other parties
and their counsel and must file an action in court to nullify \the
award.'' Any party may elect to have the subsequent action tried to a
jury. '0  Any allegation that the award is in error because of a
miscalculation of damages or because the award is in an imperfect
form or that the award is invalid due to corruption, fraud, impartiality
on the part of the arbitrators, or an abuse of authority by the ar-
bitrators, is determined by the court sitting without a jury."3 Such
allegations must be raised by a pretrial preliminary motion or they are
waived.' If the court finds that the award is incorrect because of a
miscalculation or incorrect form, it shall modify or correct the award.
93. Id. § 3-2A-03(c).
94. Id. § 3-2A-04(e).
95. Id § 3-2A-04(f) (Supp. 1980).
96. Id § 3-2A-05(a) (1980).
97. Id § 3-2A-05(d).
98. Id.
99. Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp., 44 Md. App. 688, 410 A.2d 630 (1980).
100. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-05(h), -06(a) (1980).
101. I& §§ 3-2A-06(a), (b).
102. Id § 3-2A-06(b).
103. Id § 3-2A-06(c).
104. Id
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The rejecting party may still proceed to trial substituting the amended
award for the original one."-' If the court finds that an allegation of cor-
ruption, fraud, partiality, or abuse is true, the court shall vacate the
original award and the trial shall proceed as if there had been no
original award." Unless the award is vacated by the court, the arbitra-
tion award is admissible into evidence in the subsequent judicial pro-
ceeding and is presumed correct. The burden of proving its incorrect-
ness is placed on the party rejecting it.0 7 If the verdict in the subse-
quent proceeding is not more favorable to the party rejecting the
panel's original award than was the original award, the costs of the
judicial proceedings shall be assessed against the rejecting party.'
Despite a multi-pronged attack, the Maryland Health Care Malprac-
tice Claims Act was held to be constitutional in Attorney General v.
Johnson.' The Act was first attacked on the basis that it constituted
an improper delegation of judicial authority to an administrative agen-
cy. The court rejected that argument stating that a condition prece-
dent to court action in the form of arbitration does not impermissibly
transgress separation of powers principles. The essence of judicial
power, the Johnson court said, is the final authority to render and en-
force judgment. Since the panel has no such authority, its establish-
ment by the Act does not constitute an improper delegation of judicial
power. Furthermore, the court stated, the panels are independent,
they are chosen and compensated by the parties themselves, and they
are dissolved following the conclusion of only a single case."0
The plaintiffs next argued that the financial burden and delay placed
upon them by the arbitration requirement effectively barred their ac-
cess to the courts. The bar association joined the attack and argued
that a number of "infringements" -the admissibility into evidence of
the panel decision with the presumption of correctness; the failure to
allow an attack before the jury on the possible corruption, fraud, or
partiality of the arbitrators; the failure to allow voir dire of the panel
members; and the cost and delay of arbitration- taken together, result
in denial of access to the courts to malpractice claimants. The court
refused to find that any or all of these grounds constitute a depriva-
tion of the right to trial by jury or a bar to access to the courts."'
The admissibility of the panel's decision into evidence at a subse-
quent trial, the court said, is a simple rule of evidence and does not
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id § 3-2A-06(d).
108. Id. § 3-2A-06(e).
109. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978).
110. Id at 283-87, 385 A.2d at 63-65.
111. Id at 291, 385 A.2d at 67.
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violate the right to trial by jury. The presumption of correctness is
merely a proper legislative enactment concerning the burden of
proof."2 The fact that the jury is not given the opportunity to consider
whether panel members may have been biased, corrupt, or partial has
no relevance to the question of whether the parties received that to
which they were entitled-an appeal to a jury de novo. "3 The inability
of the parties to conduct a voir dire of the arbitrators, the court found,
does not constitute a denial of due process. The parties receive
biographical information about each person whose name appears on the
list of eligible arbitrators and the parties are given the opportunity to
strike the names of objectionable persons from the lists. Furthermore,
awards may be vacated by the courts on the basis that arbitrators
were not impartial, and any party may reject any award and proceed
to trial following the entry of the panel's decision. "'
The court also refused to void the arbitration system on the basis of
the alleged expense and delay it caused litigants. The law, the court
noted, may impose reasonable restrictions on the right of access to the
courts. It is permissible for the legislature to exercise its police power
for the benefit of the public health by attempting to decrease the cost
of medical malpractice insurance premiums payable by health care pro-
viders and, accordingly, the cost of medical expenses paid by patients.
The expense and delay occasioned by the malpractice arbitration
system in Maryland, the court found, was not so unreasonable in rela-
tion to its legitimate goal that it contravened the parties' due process
rights." -5 Unlike the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Mattos v.
Thompson,' the Supreme Court of Maryland found no pretrial condi-
tions or procedures within the arbitration system which were so
burdensome or oppressive that the claimants' right of access to the
courts and right to trial by jury were made "practically unavailable.' 1 7
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the statutory classification requir-
ing arbitration of medical malpractice claims violated their equal pro-
tection rights. In analyzing the equal protection challenge, the court
held that the Act did not infringe upon or interfere with the exercise
of any fundamental right and that, therefore, the rational basis, rather
than the strict scrutiny, standard for deciding equal protection claims
was applicable." 8 In applying the rational basis test, the court held that
the legislature's distinction between malpractice claimants and other
112. Id- at 292, 294, 385 A.2d at 68, 69.
113. Id- at 296, 385 A.2d at 70.
114. Id- at 297, 385 A.2d at 70.
115. Id at 298-300, 385 A.2d at 71-72.
116. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980); see notes 65-73 and accompanying text supra.
117. 282 Md. at 306, 385 A.2d at 75-76.
118. Id. at 309-10, 385 A.2d at 77-78.
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tort claimants was reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of the
Act, that is, the protection of the public health and welfare by assuring
the availability of malpractice insurance to health care providers at
reasonable rates.119 The court stated that it would reach the same
result even under a means-focused or substantial relationship test
because the Act bears a fair and substantial relationship to the goal of
encouraging the resolution of medical malpractice claims without the
use of judicial proceedings, thereby holding down the costs of medical
malpractice insurance and the cost of medical care in general.12
Although the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act became
legally effective on July 1, 1976, because of the constitutional attacks
upon it, it did not go into practical operation until July or August,
1978.121 By March 10, 1981, approximately 750 cases had been filed with
the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Office. Of that number, ar-
bitration had been completed in 44 and arbitration was pending in ap-
proximately 575. According to the Director of the Maryland Health
Claims Arbitration Office, 75 to 80 percent of the cases filed are settled
by the parties prior to the rendering of a decision by the arbitration
panel."'
The Director attributes the delay in deciding the remaining 575
cases to several causes. At the inception of the arbitration program, he
stated, there were too few attorney and health care provider arbitra-
tion panelists available. That problem no longer exists, however, since
the program has become better known and since the per diem rates for
arbitrators have been more than doubled. The Director also noted that
the system's original director was absent because of illness throughout
most of his term. Some cause for delay is attributable to the parties,
primarily plaintiffs' counsel, and to the failure of arbitration panel
chairpersons to pressure counsel into taking action on their cases.
Finally, the Director noted that the system suffered from a lack of ade-
quate financing resulting in a shortage of personnel. Currently, the
average time required for a medical malpractice claim to progress from
date of filing to arbitration panel decision is nine to fifteen months in
those cases which are actively pressed by the parties' counsel."'
119. Id. at 312, 385 A.2d at 79.
120. Id. at 312-13, 385 A.2d at 79.
121. This information and that following was received in response to a questionnaire
submitted by the author and answered by Walter R. Tabler, Director of the Maryland
Health Claims Arbitration Office.
122. Id Mr. Tabler did not explain the discrepancy between the 750 cases filed for ar-
bitration and the 619 cases in which arbitration had been completed or was pending. It
may well be that those 131 cases represent the 75 to 80 percent of the cases settled
before completion of the arbitration panels' review.
123. Id.
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Following a decision of the arbitration panel, approximately twenty-
five to thirty percent of the cases decided are pursued through litiga-
tion in the Maryland courts. The cost per year of the Maryland arbitra-
tion system is estimated to be $200,000.121 According to its Director,
the Maryland system is still under constitutional attack in the state's
courts. Despite those attacks and despite what he referred to as "ob-
vious shortcomings in the system, some of which currently are the sub-
ject of proposed legislative correction," the Director concluded his
remarks to the author by stating that "I feel the program basically is
accomplishing the purposes for which it was intended.""
For purposes of comparison and recommendation, which will be
developed further,'128 it is interesting to note the results achieved pur-
suant to a different type of arbitration system currently operating in
the Ninth Judicial District of New York." Beginning on February 1,
1980, arbitration panels composed of three attorneys began hearing
claims in that District in which the amount of damages sought was
$6,000 or less. Following introduction of the mandatory program, civil
court calendars were cleared of such cases in a four county area in less
than three months time. Trial delays of between nine and sixteen
months have been cut to from thirty to forty days and forty-two per-
cent of the claims filed are being settled before or during the panel
sessions. The system also has been introduced into the Third Judicial
District where claim disposition has increased twenty-six percent over
that for the same period during the previous year. Although either
party may reject the arbitrators' decision and go to trial on the claim,
only 8 of the first 200 cases decided by arbitration panels in the Ninth
Judicial District were appealed. The system has been judged so effec-
tive by New York state court officials that it is going to be expanded
to many more counties throughout the state and the jurisdictional limit
may be raised to $15,000."
It is not possible, of course, to conclude from the New York ex-
perience that mandatory arbitration will be successful in medical
malpractice cases. Indeed, the Maryland experience may indicate that
it will not be highly successful. The New York arbitration system is ob-
viously limited by its confinement to cases in which damages sought
are less than $6,000. Most of those are probably not medical malprac-
tice cases and many may be less complicated and easier to present
than malpractice cases. Not all medical malpractice cases need be ex-
124. I&
125. Id
126. See text at sections V and VI infra.
127. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1980, § D, at 15, col. 1.
128. Id
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tremely complicated, however, and not all involve hundreds of
thousands of dollars in damage claims. The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania itself noted in Mattos v. Thompson that many of the claims
pending under the Pennsylvania Health Care Services Malpractice Act
were for $10,000 or less. 9 As a preliminary conclusion, however, even
though the New York experience does not offer proof that mandatory
arbitration provides an expeditious and just alternative to malpractice
litigation, it does indicate that arbitration is successful in some in-
stances and it may indicate potential for success in malpractice situa-
tions as well.
Should the Pennsylvania legislature decide that mandatory arbitra-
tion is not a suitable alternative to malpractice litigation, it may still
consider providing the opportunity to arbitrate malpractice disputes to
patients and health care providers who would choose to do so.
IV. AGREEMENTS TO ENTER BINDING ARBITRATION
As previously discussed, 130 some state legislatures have mandated
that medical malpractice claimants enter into nonbinding arbitration in
an attempt to resolve their claims against health care providers as a
condition precedent to bringing such a suit in a court of law. Other
state legislatures have enacted laws permitting patients and health
care providers to enter into agreements providing that should a
malpractice claim arise between them they will submit the dispute to
binding arbitration instead of pursuing the action through the courts. 31
Michigan provides an example of the latter type of legislation."2
In Michigan, hospitals (which by definition include hospitals, clinics,
health maintenance organizations, and sanitariums)" 3 are required to
offer to patients the opportunity to sign an agreement "to arbitrate a
dispute, controversy, or issue arising out of health care or treatment
rendered by the hospital.""' 4 Hospitals are not required to offer the op-
tion to patients receiving out-patient diagnostic services only, but are
required to offer it to all other patients."' Hospitals which do not com-
ply with the Act's requirement may suffer the loss of their malpractice
129. 421 A.2d at 195.
130. See text at sections II and III supra.
131. Some states also permit parties to enter into an agreement to arbitrate a
malpractice dispute arising between them after the alleged injury has occurred. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 6-5-485 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1980).
132. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040 -.5065 (Supp. 1980).
133. Id § 600.5040(2)(c).
134. Id § 600.5042(1).
135. Michigan Ins. Bureau Bull. No. 3 concerning the medical arbitration program; pro-
vided to the author through the courtesy of the Michigan Insurance Commissioner and
her staff.
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insurance. It is important, therefore, for hospitals to have documented
proof of those instances when they offer agreements to arbitrate to pa-
tients which the patients decline to sign.3' Independent physicians may
offer such an opportunity to their patients, although they are not re-
quired to do so.13 Nursing homes and convalescent centers, likewise,
are not required to offer the option to their patients."
The Michigan law attaches certain conditions to the offering of the
agreement to the patient and to his or her signing it. Execution of the
agreement may not be made a prerequisite to care.139 If a person is be-
ing treated in an emergency situation, he or she may be offered the
agreement, but such offer may not be made until after the emergency
care or treatment is completed-'.4 The agreement is revocable by the
patient or a representative of the patient within sixty days after ex-
ecution in the case of a health care provider or within sixty days of
discharge in the case of a hospital by notifying the health care pro-
vider or the hospital of the revocation in writing. Neither the health
care provider nor the hospital is permitted to revoke the agreement. "1
The agreement must contain, in twelve point bold face type directly
above the space for the patient's signature, the notice that "This agree-
ment to arbitrate is not a prerequisite to health care or treatment and
may be revoked within 60 days after execution [or discharge] by
notification in writing."4 2 The patient signing the agreement must be
provided with a copy of the agreement and with an information
brochure detailing the agreement and the revocation procedures. "3 The
agreement remains in effect for one year from the date of execution
and may be renewed by execution of a new agreement. " " Each hospital
admission, out-patient surgical treatment, or emergency room visit re-
quires the signing of a new agreement. Nonsurgical hospital/out-patient
agreements and physician/patient agreements may cover any treat-
136. Id. See also Michigan Ins. Bureau Bull. No. 1 concerning the medical arbitration
program.
137. Michigan Ins. Bureau Bull. No. 1.
138. I&
139. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(2), .5042(2) (Supp. 1980).
140. Id. § 600.5042(1).
141. Id. §§ 600.5041(3), .5042(3).
142. Id. §§ 600.5041(5), .5042(4).
143. Id. §§ 600.5041(6), .5042(7).
144. Id. § 600.5041(4). Although § 600.5041(4) applies to agreements entered into be-
tween health care providers and patients and no similar provision exists in the law
concerning agreements entered into between hospitals and patients, the law has been in-
terpreted to apply a one year expiration period to the latter type of agreement as well.
See American Arbitration Association, Frequently Asked Questions About Arbitration,
(pamphlet reprinted from Michigan Hospitals, April, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Frequently
Asked Questions].
Duquesne Law Review
ment rendered within the one year period.'15 An agreement to ar-
bitrate which includes the conditions required by the Act is presumed
valid. 6
Two cases have been litigated in Michigan on the issue of the sixty
day revocation period.'47 In the first, Amwake v. Mercy-Memorial
Hospital4 where the issue concerned the starting date of the sixty day
period, the court held that any revocation must be accomplished within
sixty days of discharge from the hospital and that the transfer of a pa-
tient from one hospital to another for treatment of a condition arising
during the original hospital stay governed by the agreement did not
constitute a discharge. The patient's initiation of suit against the first
hospital while she was in the second hospital, then, was an effective
revocation of the arbitration agreement. 8 By the court's reasoning,
the sixty day period had not even begun to run at the time she in-
stituted suit.4 9 The court also stated that in the case of an unconscious
patient, the sixty day period would not run during the period of un-
consciousness and that patients should be given sixty days from the
time their disabilities terminate to revoke any arbitration agreement
they entered. 5'
In the second case, Capman v. Harper-Grace Hospital, the plaintiff
attempted to apply the discovery rule to revocation of the agreement.
That is, she attempted to revoke the arbitration agreement not within
sixty days of its execution but within sixty days of the time she
discovered the alleged injury which prompted her to file suit. The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating that while the
discovery rule made sense in tolling the statute of limitations where
otherwise a patient could suffer a harsh result if he or she were unable
to recognize the existence of a potential claim before the running of
the statute of limitations, it made no sense in terms of the Malpractice
Arbitration Act where no such harsh result would occur."' The pur-
pose of the Act is to permit patients to determine before they receive
treatment whether they wish to pursue potential malpractice claims by
way of arbitration or litigation. Post-discovery revocation simply does
not advance the purpose of the Act. The court did recognize that a dif-
145. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5042(6) (Supp. 1980). See also Frequently Asked
Questions, note 144 supra; Patient Information Booklet, a pamphlet approved by the
Michigan Commissioner of Insurance (February 17, 1976).
146. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(7), -.5042(8) (Supp. 1980).
147. Capman v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 96 Mich. App. 510, 294 N.W.2d 205 (1980); Am-
wake v. Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 92 Mich. App. 546, 285 N.W.2d 369 (1979).
148. 92 Mich. App. at 552-54, 285 N.W.2d at 372-73.
149. Id. at 552, 285 N.W.2d at 372.
150. Id at 553, 285 N.W.2d at 373.
151. 96 Mich. App. at 516-17, 294 N.W.2d at 208.
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ferent rule would be applied if the patient were physicially or mentally
incapable of revoking the agreement within the sixty day period. '
Maine also has legislation permitting patients and health care pro-
viders to enter into agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice
claims. '53 In terms of revoking the agreement to arbitrate, Maine
allows patients receiving treatment from a hospital to revoke the
agreement within thirty days after discharge and those receiving
treatment from physicians to revoke within sixty days of execution of
the agreement. 54 Like Michigan, Maine does not permit hospitals to
revoke the agreement, but, unlike Michigan, the Maine legislation does
permit physicians to revoke the agreement within sixty days of execu-
tion. 65
In Michigan, medical malpractice arbitration proceedings are con-
ducted by an arbitration association without charge to the claimant.
The administrative expense of each case is $200 per party and the claim-
ant's share of the expense is borne by the arbitration administration
fund established under the insurance code or by the respondent par-
ties.5' Each arbitration panel consists of three members: an attorney,
who serves as the chairperson of the panel; a physician, preferably but
not necessarily from the respondent physician's specialty; and a person
who is not an attorney, a licensee of the health care profession involved,
or a representative of a hospital or insurance company. If a case is
brought against a hospital only, a hospital administrator may be
substituted for the physician panelist; if the case involves a health care
provider other than a physician, a licensee of the health care profes-
sion involved will be substituted for the physician panelist. 57 The par-
ties are provided with lists of qualified arbitrators in each of the
categories and are given the opportuntiy to strike from the lists the
names of persons they find objectionable. The association selects the
final arbitrators from the first candidate mutually agreeable to the
parties from each list. If after a second circulation of such lists the par-
ties are not able to agree on a set of arbitrators, the remainder of the
panel shall be chosen by the association, subject to strike by the par-
ties." ' The parties are not bound by the list of arbitrators circulated
by the association and may mutually agree upon a panelist not sug-
gested by the association."'
152. Id-
153. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 2701-2715 (Supp. 1980).
154. Id. § 2702.
155. I&
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(1) (Supp. 1980).
157. Pub. Act No. 38, § 1, 1980 Mich. Legis. Serv. (West) (to be codified in MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(2)).
158. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.50443), (4), (5) (Supp. 1980).
159. Id. § 600.5044(6).
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A different form of arbitrator selection occurs in South Dakota,
which also employs a system where patients and health care providers
are permitted to enter agreements to arbitrate malpractice claims."' In
South Dakota, there is established a health care services arbitration
panel for each congressional district. The presidents of the state bar,
state medical, and state hospital associations each choose twelve of
their members within each district to serve as arbitrators for three
year terms."' The parties choose two arbitrators (for example, an at-
torney and a physician) to hear their case; the two chosen arbitrators
or the court chooses a third."2 The South Dakota system raises an in-
teresting question of bias. As noted earlier, there have been challenges
to arbitration systems on the basis that the physician member of the
panel will be biased against the patient.' It appears that in South
Dakota the system has built in a possible pro-establishment bias. That
is, since not all health care providers will choose to belong to their
state professional organizations, will attorneys and physicians who do
belong to such organizations be biased against those who do not?'" In
160. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25B-1 to -26 (1979).
161. Id § 21-25B-4.
162. Id § 21-25B-13.
163. See, e.g., Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d at 191-92; State ex reL Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 514, 261 N.W.2d 434, 445 (1978).
164. The hypothetical situation suggested by the South Dakota arbitration system
raises an issue somewhat analogous to that decided by the Supreme Court in Gibson v.
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). There, a group of licensed optometrists who were not
members of the Alabama Optometric Association, the state professional organization of
optometrists, were charged by the Association with unprofessional conduct. The charges
of unprofessional conduct were to be heard by the Alabama Board of Optometry, all
members of which, by law, were members of the Alabama Optometric Association. Prior
to the Board hearing, those optometrists charged filed a complaint in a federal district
court seeking an injunction against the hearing primarily on the ground that the Board
was biased and could not provide to the optometrists a fair and impartial hearing in
accordance with due process of law. The district court agreed with the optometrists and
granted the injunction. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's reasoning that "the pecuniary interest of the members of the Board of Optometry
had sufficient substance to disqualify them" from hearing the unprofessional conduct
charges. Id. at 579.
Although the question raised by the South Dakota malpractice arbitration procedure is
similar to that presented in Gibson, in that arbitration panel members are also members
of their respective state professional organizations while those whose cases they hear may
not be, the ultimate issue to be decided in the case is sufficiently dissimilar to allow the
conjecture that if the South Dakota situation were to be litigated, Gibson would not be
decisive to its resolution. In Gibson it was clear that if all Alabama optometrists not
members of the state professional organization were to be found guilty of unprofessional
conduct, and accordingly stripped of their licenses to practice, the number of optometrists
in the state would have been reduced from 192 to 100. The increase in the optometric
business per optometrist occasioned by the drastic decline in the number of optometrists
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all likelihood, such a challenge would suffer the same fate as those
challenging physician membership on the panels in general. Without an
actual showing of bias against a physician who chooses not to be a
member of his or her state professional organization, the court prob-
ably would not order a new hearing before a different panel or change
the panel membership.
Michigan law provides: "A party to the arbitration agreement may
demand arbitration of a claim and the proceeding shall be instituted as
provided by rule of the association .... I'-' The language "A party" in-
dicates that arbitration may be instituted by a health care provider or
a hospital as well as by a patient. It must be noted, however, that the
arbitration agreement does not apply to disputes over charges for ser-
vices rendered.166 In cases involving common questions of law and fact,
if separate arbitration agreements exist between a plaintiff and a
number of defendants, or between defendants, all of the disputes may
be consolidated into one arbitration proceeding.67 A person who is not
a party to the arbitration agreement may join the arbitration at the re-
quest of any party and each party to the arbitration is bound by the
joinder of the new party.16 8
After the appointment of a panel of arbitrators, the parties may con-
duct discovery as if the matter were any civil action pending before a
would obviously have benefited those optometrists who were members of the state profes-
sional organization. Since only such members could serve on the Alabama Board of Op-
tometry, those Board members would be among the likely recipients of the increased
business. The potential pecuniary interest of the Board members in the unprofessional
conduct decision, therefore, was obvious. No such pecuniary interest is evident in the
hypothetical South Dakota situation. It is possible that were a South Dakota physician
who was not a member of the state professional organization to be found liable in
malpractice, his or her practice might decline and a member of the state professional
organization might benefit from any patient's choosing not to frequent that physician.
Such could also be the case, however, were a physician who was a member of the state
professional organization to be found liable in malpractice. And, in either case, the physi-
cian's patients could choose to seek treatment from a physician not a member of the state
professional organization. Furthermore, the issue facing the arbitration panel is not action
which would result in the deprivation of a physician's license to practice medicine but
rather the potential malpractice liability of the physician. The only substantial repercus-
sion of such a decision on the members of the state professional organization would be
that the medical malpractice insurance premiums of all physicians might rise. The
possibility of such an occurrence has generally been rejected as a ground for disqualifying
a health care provider from sitting on a medical malpractice arbitration panel. See, e.g.,
State ex TeL Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 515-16, 261 N.W.2d 434, 445-46 (1978).
165. 'MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5046(1) (Supp. 1980).
166. This provision is clearly stated on the arbitration agreements entered into be-
tween patients and health care providers or hospitals.
167. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5046(3) (Supp. 1980).
168. Id § 600.5046(4).
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trial court."9 The hearing before the arbitrators shall be informal, but
parties are entitled to be represented by counsel, to present evidence,
to testify, and to cross-examine any witnesses. ° The panel may call a
neutral expert on its own motion and such expert shall be subject to
cross-examination by the parties. 1 ' The panel may order the submis-
sion of briefs by the parties within thirty days after the close of the
hearing,' and it shall render its decision within thirty days after the
close of the hearing or receipt of briefs.'
South Dakota, again, provides an interesting variation on the panel
hearing procedure. South Dakota arbitrators conduct a bifurcated hear-
ing."' The first phase of the hearing is limited to questions of liability.
If the panel finds that one or more defendants are liable to the plain-
tiff, there is imposed a thirty day waiting period during which time the
parties may attempt to settle the issue of damages. If there is no set-
tlement, the panel reconvenes at the end of the thirty day period and
makes a determination as to damages.7 5
Alaska, too, provides an interesting variation in terms of expert
testimony. Unlike Michigan, where panelists may call a neutral expert
to testify during the proceedings, in Alaska, the arbitrators are
authorized to refer the matter before them to an advisory panel which
will provide expert advice on the medical facts of the case. 7 '
In Michigan, a majority of the panel arbitrators may grant any relief
"deemed equitable and just," including money damages or provision for
hospitalization, rehabilitation, or support services. 7 The award must
be in writing and should include a determination of all questions sub-
mitted to the panel the resolution of which is necessary to determine
the dispute.' The panel must also render a written opinion setting
forth its reasons for its determination of liability or nonliability and for
the type and amount of award entered.'79 In instances where liability is
found and there are two or more health care provider respondents, the
panel must also determine the degree of liability of each respondent
and must apportion damages between or among them. 8'
Because the Michigan system is one of binding arbitration, appeal to
169. Id § 600.5048(1).
170. Id. §§ 600.5043(1), .5050(1).
171. Id. § 600.5050(6).
172. Id § 600.5054(2).
173. Id. § 600.5054(3).
174. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-21 (1979).
175. Id.
176. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(i) (Supp. 1980).
177. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5054(1) (Supp. 1980).
178. Id § 600.5054(4).
179. Id. § 600.5055(1).
180. Id. § 600.5055(2), (3).
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the courts following a panel decision is very limited. A court may
vacate an arbitration panel award only where the award was procured
through fraud, corruption, or undue means; where an arbitrator was
partial or corrupt or the arbitrators committed an act of misconduct
prejudicing the rights of any party; where the arbitrators exceeded
their power; or where the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing
upon reasonable cause, refused to hear evidence relevant to the con-
troversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing in a manner prejudicial
to the rights of the parties.'81 If the court does vacate the award, it
may order a new hearing before a different set of arbitrators or by the
court. If the award is vacated on the basis that the arbitrators exceed-
ed their authority or conducted the hearing in a manner prejudicial to
the parties, the court may order a rehearing before the same panel of
arbitrators.'82 If the motion to vacate is denied, the court shall confirm
the award.' The court may also modify or correct an award on the
basis that the award contains a miscalculation of figures or mistaken
description of persons or property, that the arbitrators have made an
award upon a matter not submitted to them and any modification may
be made without affecting the merits of the issues submitted, or that
the award is in an imperfect form. Following a modification or correc-
tion of an award, the court shall confirm the award as so modified or
corrected.'84
To date, no Michigan appellate court has ruled on the constitutionali-
ty of the Michigan medical malpractice arbitration system. The trial
courts have divided on the issue with two holding it to be constitu-
tional' and a third holding it to be unconstitutional because the
presence of a physician on the panel violates the due process rights of
the plaintiff.88
The author has no figures on the actual percentages of patients in
Michigan who are signing agreements to arbitrate their potential
medical malpractice claims. In April, 1978, however, it was estimated
that sixty to eighty percent of all patients who were offered the oppor-
tunity to sign such an agreement were doing so. 87 Figures are
181. MICH. GEN. CT. RULES ANN. § 769.9(1) (1970).
182. Id. § 769.9(3).
183. Id. § 769.9(4).
184. Id. § 769.10.
185. Malek v. Jayakar, Civ. Action No. 78-802-604-NM (Wayne County Cir. Ct.,
February 5, 1979); Pipper v. DiMusto, Civ. Action No. 76-8188-NM (Macomb County Cir.
Ct., August 30, 1977).
186. Manuel v. Pierce, Civ. Action No. 79-929209-NM (Wayne County Cir. Ct., July 14,
1980).
187. Arford, The Latest on Michigan's Arbitration System with Typical Questions
Answered, 77 MICH. MED. 208 (1978).
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available on the operation of the arbitration system following institu-
tion of arbitration actions.' Between January 1, 1976, the inception
date of the program, and September 30, 1980, 232 claims for arbitra-
tion had been filed. Over two-thirds of those cases had been filed
subsequent to January 1, 1979. The Michigan Insurance
Commissioner's staff believes that the acceleration in filings is due to
the running of the statute of limitations of actions arising after the in-
ception of the program and the court enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 9
Of the 232 cases filed prior to September 30, 1980, 71 had been closed
by that date: 20 were withdrawn by the patient prior to a panel hear-
ing; 34 were settled by the parties prior to a hearing with the amount
of settlement ranging from $363 to $220,000; 15 had been decided by
arbitration panels with 12 verdicts in favor of respondents and 3 in
favor of plaintiffs with the awards in the latter ranging from $750 to
$20,000; 190 and 2 were dismissed by the panels on procedural grounds.
On September 30, 1980, there were 161 cases pending for arbitration.
The Commissioner's staff indicated that these 161 cases do not repre-
sent a "backlog" in the system for several reasons. Eighteen of the
cases were being held in abeyance at the request of the parties or by
order of the court and fifteen others were scheduled for hearing at
that time. A large number of the cases had been filed within the
previous two years. The parties are guaranteed six months to com-
plete discovery; most use the entire six months and some then obtain
extensions. Finally, the Commissioner's staff noted, there is some
"stalling" on the part of the parties pending final appellate court
resolution on the issue of the constitutionality of the system.'
The average time required for those cases actually being heard by a
panel from the date of filing a claim to final determination by the ar-
bitrators is thirteen months. Seventy-six percent of all cases closed,
however, have been settled or withdrawn by the parties prior to panel
determination. As of September 30, 1980, no cases were being pursued
through litigation following a panel decision. There is no taxpayer ex-
188. The following information was gathered in response to a questionnaire submitted
by the author to the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance and answered by Randy
Watkins, Coordinator of the Medical Arbitration Program for the Insurance Bureau, and
Michael Arford, Director, Michigan Medical Arbitration and Health Services, American
Arbitration Association.
189. Id.
190. Id It is impossible to tell from these figures whether parties in cases with
stronger positions for plaintiffs are more likely to settle before a hearing by the arbitra-
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pense involved with the Michigan medical malpractice arbitration
system because it is funded by assessments against malpractice in-
surance carriers. While the Commissioner's staff members could not
estimate any costs savings to the state promoted by the use of arbitra-
tion rather than traditional civil litigation, they theorized that it may
he "substantial." The bases for the staffs belief were that the average
arbitration hearing has consumed only 2.1 day's time and has cost, on
the average, only $1,638.12 A member of the Commissioner's staff con-
cluded his information to the author by stating:
As more cases are closed through the arbitration process, the available
data on these cases is beginning to indicate that the arbitration system
has the potential to accomplish the objectives for which it was instituted.
That is to say, a faster resolution of claims, and at lower costs, while pro-
viding a fair resolution to all parties. 93
In addition to mandatory, nonbinding arbitration, and voluntary,
binding arbitration, some states have enacted a third alternative to
malpractice litigation: the medical malpractice review panel.
V. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW PANELS
At least eighteen states currently have in operation panels which
review medical malpractice claims before those claims are adjudicated
by a civil court. The state systems vary widely in terms of panel com-
position, panel duties, type of decision rendered, and court review. No
attempt will be made here to outline all of the different features of
each system operating in each state. Rather, an examination will be
made of Tennessee's Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims
Act of 1975' 94 as representative of medical malpractice review panels in
general. Some reference will be made as well to other review panel
systems which differ significantly from the Tennessee system and are
worthy of note either because of the extremity or the importance of
their diversity.
The Tennessee Act, which became effective on July 1, 1975, requires
that when a medical malpractice action is filed in any court the judge
shall refer the case to the medical malpractice review board for
review.' 5 The parties may agree to waive the referral to the board.'94
192. Id
193. Id
194. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-101 to -121 (1980).
195. Id. § 29-26-104(b) (1980). Some states require that a malpractice action be submit-
ted to a medical malpractice panel for review prior to being filed with the court. See, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-301 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.070 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-5-14(D) (1978).
196. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-104(b) (1980).
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Unless both the claimant and the provider stipulate, however, that
board review will not facilitate disposition of the action and unless
they both waive board review, no medical malpractice action may be
tried by a court without a hearing on the claim's merits before the
review board.197
The Act provides for the establishment of a medical review board in
each of three "grand divisions" within the state.198 Each grand division
contains a master panel from which the individual boards are drawn.199
The master panel is composed of a list of attorneys licensed to practice
in Tennessee, submitted by the Tennessee Bar Association; a list of
physicians, divided by specialty, licensed to practice in Tennessee, sub-
mitted by the Tennessee Medical Association; a list of health care pro-
viders submitted by "[a]ll appropriate state professional organizations";
and a list of sixteen persons representative of the general public, none
of whom are attorneys, or health care providers or have connections
with the insurance industry, appointed by the governor with the ap-
proval of the speakers of the state senate and the state house of
representatives."'0 All persons so named shall serve four-year terms as
review board panelists. 211 Panels generally consist of three members:
an attorney, a health care provider, and a member of the general
public. 12 Panelists are chosen by the executive director of the board
and are selected for service in the order in which their names appear
on the various lists.0 3 In the event of a question as to the specialty of
the physician/respondent or of a disagreement by the parties concern-
ing which health care provider should participate in the review, the
decision of the director, after consultation with an officer of the Ten-
nessee Medical Association or another appropriate professional
organization, is final.0 4 If the malpractice claim concerns a health care
provider other than a physician, the director shall select an additional
panelist from the appropriate category of health care provider to serve
on the board. If multiple health care providers are involved in the
claim, the director shall select an additional person from each health
197. Id. § 29-26-113(a). The Tennessee Act has been held to be applicable to cases
brought pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts sitting in Tennessee,
Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), although par-
ties may agree to waive board review in federal actions just as they may in state actions,
Cline v. Richards, 455 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
198. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-104(a), -105 (1980).
199. Id. § 29-26-108.
200. Id. §§ 29-26-108(1)(A)-(D).
201. Id. § 29-26-108(4).
202. Id. § 29-26-107.
203. Id. §§ 29-26-106(b)(4), -108(1)(A)-(D).
204. Id. § 29-26-108(3).
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care provider category involved but none of the original board
members (that is, attorney, physician, citizen) shall be removed from
the panel."5 Although the parties do not play a direct role in choosing
the panelists who make up the review board, they are provided with
the opportunity to voir dire the panelists in writing prior to the hear-
ing on the claim. On the basis of the answers to their written ques-
tions, the parties may challenge and seek removal of any prospective
board members." 6
Panel composition is one factor involved in medical review boards
which varies greatly by jurisdiction. Kansas and Louisiana, for exam-
ple, have systems in which all voting members of the panels are health
care providers."7 Panels in Massachusetts are composed of one at-
torney, one physician, and one superior court justice."8 Panels vary not
only by type of panelist, but by number as well. Panels in North
Dakota are composed of five members" 9 and those in New Mexico of
six.21 Panels in Wisconsin are composed of three members or five,
depending upon the amount in controversy and the wishes of the par-
ties.211
In Tennessee, board hearings are to be conducted within six months
after the parties' pleadings are filed with the board. Any case not
heard within one year after the date of the filing of the pleadings with
the board shall be referred back to the circuit court for disposition." 2
At least three weeks prior to the board hearing date, the parties shall
submit to the director all pertinent written material which will be
presented to the board. Board members may have access to the writ-
ten material prior to the hearing itself.213 Board hearings in Tennessee
are conducted in accordance with the state's Administrative Pro-
cedures Act.214 All parties shall be present or shall be represented by
counsel at the board hearings. If a claimant fails to appear at a hearing
and does not show good cause for his or her absence, the formal state-
ment of the board shall include the absence as a fact and the presump-
tion that the claim is without merit as a conclusion. If the health care
provider fails to appear at the hearing and does not show good cause
for the absence, the board's formal statement shall include the absence
205. Id § 29-26-108(2).
206. Id. § 29-26-111(c).
207. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4901 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(C) (West
Supp. 1981).
208. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (MichielLaw. Co-op Supp. 1981).
209. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1-01 (Supp. 1979).
210. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-17(D) (1978).
211. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.03, .04 (West 1980).
212. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-104(c) (1980).
213. Id § 29-26-111(b).
214. Id. § 29-26-112(a). See i&t §§ 4-5-101 to -131 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
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as a fact and the presumption that the health care provider has admit-
ted liability as a conclusion.21
The conduct of hearings is another matter in which jurisdictions
vary in terms of medical malpractice review panels. In Idaho, for exam-
ple, parties may attend hearings only at the order of the panel.21 In
Louisiana, after all of the evidence is submitted to the panel in writing,
the parties may convene the panel for the purpose of questioning the
panelists."7 In Massachusetts, the plaintiff makes an offer of proof to
allow the panel to determine whether the plaintiff's claim, if properly
substantiated, presents a legitimate question of liability for judicial in-
quiry.21' All panel proceedings in Nebraska and New Hampshire are
confidential. 2 1
In Tennessee, within thirty days after the close of the hearing, the
board shall notify all parties of its recommendations." The formal
statement of recommendations and/or the minority report of the board,
if there is a dissenting minority, shall consist of one or more
statements that the evidence supports the conclusion that the defend-
ant failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as alleged
by the plaintiff; that the evidence does not support the plaintiff's
allegation that the defendant failed to act with the appropriate stan-
dard of care; that there exists a material question of fact, not requiring
expert opinion, bearing on liability, for consideration by the court or
jury; or that the conduct alleged was or was not a factor in the
resulting damages and, if it was, whether the plaintiff suffered any
disability or impairment and the extent of that disability or impair-
ment.
21
The type of decision rendered by the review board is another area
in which states vary in terms of medical malpractice review. Boards in
Arizona, Kansas, and New Mexico, for example, consider only the ques-
tion of liability.12 Boards in Hawaii, Idaho, and Rhode Island, at least
in certain instances, consider issues of damages as well as liability."
Boards in Massachusetts and Nevada consider only whether the com-
plaint has sufficient merit to warrant judicial review."'
215. Id. §§ 29-26-113(b)-(c) (1980).
216. IDAHO CODE § 6-1008 (1979).
217. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299:47(E) (West 1977).
218. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (MichielLaw. Co-op Supp. 1981).
219. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2846 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-A:8 (1974).
220. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-104(c) (1980).
221. Id. § 29-26-112(c).
222. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(F) (Supp. 1957-80); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4903
(1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-20 (1978).
223. HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-15(a) (Supp. 1980) and (b) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-1004 (1979);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-6, -7 (Supp. 1980).
224. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41A.060 (1977).
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Once the board in Tennessee has entered its formal recommenda-
tions, the parties have thirty days to accept or reject them. If both
parties accept the recommendations in writing, a settlement agree-
ment will be prepared and executed by the parties. If either party fails
to respond within thirty days, rejection of the recommendations will be
presumed. If either party rejects the recommendations or if despite
the parties' acceptance of the recommendations no settlement agree-
ment is executed, the claimant may proceed with his or her malprac-
tice claim in the court in which it was originally filed.'
Most states have provisions similar to Tennessee's for rejection of a
panel decision and initiation or pursuit of court action. Massachusetts,
however, requires the posting of a bond by plaintiffs pursuing a
malpractice action in court following a review board decision.226 The
Massachusetts bond requirement was held to be constitutional despite
allegations that it violated equal protection, due process, and separa-
tion of powers principlesY
In Tennessee, no statement or expression of opinion made during
the course of a board hearing is admissible into evidence at any subse-
quent trial of the action.' The formal recommendations and any
minority statement, however, are admissible as exceptions to the hear-
say rule.' The Supreme Court of Tennessee has decided two cases
concerning the admissibility of the boards' opinions into evidence at
subsequent trials." In each, the court recognized the admissibility of
the recommendations but made it very clear that the recommendations
225. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-26-104(d)(1)-(3) (1980).
226. MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 231, § 60B (MichielLaw. Co-op Supp. 1981).
227. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977). There is some
evidence that the bond requirement imposed by Massachusetts law reduces the number of
malpractice cases pursued through the courts following decision by the Massachusetts
Medical Malpractice Tribunals. Results from a survey of cases decided by the tribunals in-
dicated that of 241 cases heard by the tribunals, 101 were deemed sufficient to be filed in
court (and, accordingly, no bond was required for filing) and 140 were not (therefore re-
quiring the posting of a bond before filing). Of the 140 in which a bond was required, bond
was posted in only 29, thereby eliminating from the courts 79.2 percent of those cases
determined by the tribunal to be unworthy of court consideration. (Information cited in a
report labeled "House - No. 5631" provided to the author by John A. lannelli, Ad-
ministrative Assistant to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance.)
A similar bond requirement was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
Arizona. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977).
228. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-112(d)(1) (1980).
229. Id. § 29-26-112(d)(2). Prior to July 1, 1980, TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3409 prohibited
any board member from participating at a subsequent trial on the matter either as
counsel or as witness. The law currently in effect makes no reference to participation by
board members at any subsequent trial.
230. Runnells v. Rogers, 596 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1980); Baldwin v. Knight, 569 S.W.2d
450 (Tenn. 1978).
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were no substitute for the expert evidence required of plaintiffs in
medical malpractice actions."'
Again, states vary widely in terms of the admissibility of review
boards' decisions into evidence at subsequent trials and also in terms
of presenting as witnesses the members of the review boards. Loui-
siana, Nebraska, New Jersey, and North Dakota permit the parties to
submit the review panel's opinion as evidence and to call at least some
of the panelists as witnesses at trial. 2 Montana forbids the parties to
do either.m Arizona allows the panel's report to be admitted into
evidence, but does not permit the parties to call the panelists as
witnesses."' Kansas permits the parties to call the board members as
witnesses, but does not allow the introduction of the board's report into
evidence.25
Although not present in the Tennessee Act, it should also be noted
that in several states if a plaintiff prevails before the medical malprac-
tice review board, the board and/or the state medical association is
charged with helping the plaintiff to locate an expert witness who will
appear on the plaintiff's behalf at trial.238
Between July 1, 1975 and June 30, 1980, 944 cases were filed for
review with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Review Board.
21 Of
the 944 cases, 489 had been reviewed by a board, 105 had been settled
prior to review, 232 had been nonsuited prior to review, and 118 were
pending for review. The Tennessee official responding to the author's
questionnaire stated that the 118 pending cases do not represent a
"backlog" in the system. The official stated, however, that at times
cases were not heard within the ninety day period allotted for
hearing.3 8 Any delay, however, was usually caused by a request for a
continuance by the parties or counsel because of conflicting schedules,
delay in conducting discovery, or lack of time to allow for preparation
of a complex case. Information was not available on the amount of time
231. 596 S.W.2d at 89; 569 S.W.2d at 453.
232. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299:47(H) (West 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2844 (1978);
N.J. RULES 4:21(5)(d), (e) (1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1-02(1) (Supp. 1979).
233. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-704(2) (1979).
234. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(M) (Supp. 1957-1980).
235. KAN. STAT. § 65-4904(c) (1980).
236. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-307 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.090 (1977); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-5-23 (1978).
237. This and following information was gathered in response to a questionnaire sub-
mitted by the author to the Executive Director of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice
Review Board and answered by an anonymous source [hereinafter cited as Tennessee
Questionnaire Response].
238. Id. Prior to July 1, 1980, TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3403(c) provided that panel hear-
ings were to be conducted within ninety days after pleadings were filed with the board.
That time limit was extended by amendment and is now six months.
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usually required for a case to pass from time of filing to completion of
board review, but the official noted that if board review is not com-
pleted within one year of the date of filing the case is referred back to
the circuit court with which it was originally filed. Although accurate
statistics were not available concerning the number of cases pursued
through litigation following a decision by the review board, the Ten-
nessee official indicated that figures from one grand division show a
thirty-three percent litigation rate. The medical malpractice review
board system is operated at no cost to the taxpayers. Review board
operations are funded by the state's health care providers. The annual
budget for the system's operation is approximately $100,000 - $125,000,
although, the Tennessee official noted, the full amount is not always
used."O
In looking at results of medical malpractice review boards, it is also
appropriate to discuss the results of the review panel system
operating in the State of New York. No attempt has been made in this
article to discuss the New York system in detail because the system
varies within each of New York's Judicial Departments.24 For example,
in the Second Judicial Department, if there are two or more defend-
ants representing different medical specialties, the supreme court
justice presiding over the medical review panels in that district may
designate two panels so each defendant will be heard by a specialist in
his or her own field.241 In the Third Judicial Department, a panel hear-
ing a case involving a podiatrist must contain a podiatrist and may not
contain a physician from any other specialty. 2 In the Ninth Judicial
District of the Second Judicial Department, it appears that the panel
hearing consists of little more than oral argument by the parties' at-
torneys."' Despite these differences among judicial departments, the
New York experience is instructive on the issues of the effectiveness
of medical malpractice review panels.
The New York Act was enacted, as were most other such acts, with
the intention that it would weed out frivolous medical malpractice
claims against physicians, provide a forum for settlement negotiations,
and apprise litigants of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.
These actions were intended to result in a decreased number of
malpractice suits brought to trial, in lower jury verdict amounts, and
239. Tennessee Questionnaire Response, note 237 supra
240. The Act establishing New York's medical malpractice review panels may be
found at N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
241. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Medical Malpractice Panels to the Chief Ad-
ministrative Judge of the State of New York on the Operation of Medical Malpractice
Panels at 7 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Report].
242. Id. at 12.
243. Id. at 101.
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in a lessening of the congestion of civil court calendars by providing
pretrial disposition of cases with corresponding savings in time,
money, and effort."' In the opinion of the New York ad hoc committee
studying medical malpractice, the Act has not accomplished its objec-
tives. It is appropriate here to look at the Ninth Judicial District, the
district in which mandatory arbitration seems currently to be
operating so effectively,24 and at the State of New York as a whole.
In the Ninth Judicial District, between January 1976 and December
1978, 168 panel hearings were held. Of the 168 cases heard, the panel
issued recommendations in 84 cases. Of that 84, 21 cases, or 25 percent,
were then settled prior to trial. In traditional pretrial conferences held
in medical malpractice cases in the district during the same three year
period, there were 502 conferences held with 188 cases settled, a set-
tlement rate of 37.4 percent. Furthermore, the average dollar value of
those cases settled subsequent to the issuance of a panel recommenda-
tion was higher than that reached subsequent to a traditional pretrial
conference. Of those cases going to trial following a panel recommenda-
tion, the verdicts entered by the courts were generally consistent with
the panel determinations. While there appear to be correlations be-
tween panel recommendations and subsequent settlements and ver-
dicts, no definitive conclusion concerning such a relationship may be
drawn. Because post-panel settlements usually occur immediately prior
to trial, there may be many intervening factors, such as changes in the
medical or financial positions of the parties, affecting the actual settle-
ment.
2 6
In New York State as a whole between January 1976 and December
1978, 2,041 panel hearings were held resulting in 1,574 panel recom-
mendations. Of the 1,574 recommendations, there were 145 in-panel set-
tlements and 855 pretrial dispositons, representing a combined settle-
ment rate of 63.5 percent. During the same period of time, a total of
3,420 medical malpractice pretrial conferences were held throughout
the state resulting in 801 settlements or a settlement rate of 23 per-
cent. Pretrial settlements for non-medical malpractice tort cases dur-
ing that same period of time, however, averaged over 83 percent, with
the settlement rate for motor vehicle cases averaging over 87 percent.
Again, medical malpractice settlements reached subsequent to panel
hearings were higher in dollar amount than those reached subsequent
to traditional pretrial conferences.2 41
Based on these statistics and others cited in its report, the Ad Hoc
244. Id at 1.
245. See notes 127 & 128 and accompanying text supra.
246. See N.Y. Report, supra note 241, at 102-03.
247. Id. at 140-41, 143.
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Committee reached three conclusions concerning the effectiveness of
the medical malpractice panels in New York. First, the Committee con-
cluded, the system had not met the legislature's goal of promoting
pretrial settlements or of decreasing the number of cases actually be-
ing brought to trial. Rather, the Committee concluded, an agressive
pretrial conference conducted by the court in the ordinary course of its
business would promote a greater settlement rate than a court en-
cumbered by an additional procedural layer in the form of medical
malpractice panels. The cost of the panel system, the Committee noted,
is in excess of $400,000 per year, a figure that is quite substantial in
light of the panels' questionable performance and the small number of
medical malpractice cases which actually occur.248 Second, the Commit-
tee concluded that the system had likewise failed to reduce the total
dollar value of medical malpractice verdicts and settlements. Not only
has the system not alleviated the problem of excessive verdicts and
settlements, the Committee stated, but it has exacerbated it. Plaintiffs
who receive unanimous panel decisions are notorious in demanding ex-
tremely high settlements and in proceeding to trial. Defendants receiv-
ing unanimous panel decisions are rarely willing to even discuss settle-
ment.249 Finally, the Committee said, New York's medical malpractice
review system has failed to provide a structured forum for settlement
negotiations. The goal of the legislature to promote settlements at the
panel stage has simply not been met. Settlements at the panel stage
are rare-approximately 4.3 percent of all cases brought before the
panel are settled there-and litigants routinely await a panel recom-
mendation before they even consider settling. Some districts do not
even permit settlement discussions as part of the panel process.,"
The ultimate recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee was that
the panel system be abolished in New York.25" ' The current system is
counterproductive: it strengthens the resolve of the panel victor to go
to trial, it results in more costly settlements, its cost in terms of time
and money has exceeded its benefit to the judiciary, the bar, and the
public. The system has not solved the medical malpractice crisis, and it
raises questions of fairness in a constitutional, procedural, practical,
and fiscal sense.2 52 Instead of the current panel system, the Committee
proposed the adoption of an optional mediation panel system. Pursuant
to such a system, the judge assigned to the medical malpractice case
would conduct a vigorous pretrial conference making a strong effort to
248. Id at 160-62.
249. Id at 162-63.
250. Id at 163-64.
251. Id. at 165.
252. Id at 165-66.
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get the parties to settle. If the conference was not successful, the par-
ties could then choose to submit their dispute to a mediation panel or
could have their case placed on the general court calendar.21 3
VI. CONCLUSION
In the early and mid-1970's, the nation's health care providers,
malpractice insurance companies, attorneys and judges, and consumers
found themselves in the midst of a medical malpractice crisis."4 The
number of medical malpractice claims was escalating; litigation of the
claims was clogging the nation's courts; malpractice claimants found
that it was taking sometimes as long as several years to reach a
resolution of their claims; settlement and verdict amounts were in-
creasing; the premiums health care providers were being forced to pay
for malpractice insurance were reaching astronomical sums; some in-
surance carriers were refusing to provide further malpractice coverage
to providers; and some physicians were increasingly practicing defen-
sive medicine or were ceasing to practice medicine altogether. In
response to these occurrences, state legislatures began to look for
alternatives to traditional malpractice litigation. Ideally, an alternative
system of dispute resolution would provide swift, fair resolution of
malpractice disputes at less expense in terms of time, money, and
energy on the part of all those involved in malpractice litigation.
Pennsylvania was one of more than thirty states to enact legislation
to try to deal with the medical malpractice crisis."' The Pennsylvania
Health Care Services Malpractice Act mandated that malpractice
claimants submit their claims to nonbinding arbitration prior to
litigating their cases in court.2 5 After four-and-one-half years of opera-
tion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held the system to be un-
constitutional on the basis that cases moved through the arbitration
system so slowly that claimants were, in effect, being denied their con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury.257 Despite the fact that
the legislature had recently enacted amendments to the original Act
and that the Administrator had promulgated new regulations, 8 both of
which were designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
253. Id. at 166-67.
254. See Berkman, note 1 supra text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
255. Health Care Services Malpractice Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-.1006
(Purdon Supp. 1980).
256. Id § 1301.309 (declared unconstitutional, see text accompanying notes 65-77
supra).
257. Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980); see text accompanying notes 65-77
supra.
258. See notes 14-15, 83 and accompanying text supra.
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Pennsylvania system, it has now been transformed into a system of
voluntary nonbinding arbitration. There is little hope that many
malpractice claimants and health care providers will make use of the
arbitration alternative to settle their disputes. Instead, they will
return to the courts as a source of dispute resolution. Since there is no
indication that the medical malpractice crisis has abated, it is highly
probable that the Pennsylvania legislature will attempt to enact new
legislation offering another alternative to traditional litigation.
One obvious alternative to the unconstitutional Pennsylvania system
would be a mandatory, nonbinding arbitration system such as that in
operation in Maryland.259 That system has, to date, withstood constitu-
tional attack.26 Statistics available concerning the operation of the
Maryland arbitration system are not, however, extremely
encouraging." ' While the settlement rate in Maryland appears to be
high - approximately seventy-five to eighty percent - only twenty-
three percent of the cases which have been filed for arbitration have
been terminated and twenty-five to thirty percent of the cases which
have been decided by arbitration panels have then been appealed to
the state courts. There are figures available indicating that an arbitra-
tion system covering all civil cases where damages sought are less
than $6,000 is operating well in parts of New York state."2 Whether
such a system could also operate effectively if limited to medical
malpractice cases, which are often complicated to present and which
frequently demand money judgments far in excess of $6,000, is
unknown. It is probably safe to assume that were Pennsylvania to re-
enact such a system it would come under quick attack from litigants
and would have to prove very efficient and effective from its inception
in order to withstand a constitutional challenge.
A second alternative available to the legislature is a system permit-
ting patients and health care providers to enter into agreements to ar-
bitrate any malpractice dispute that may occur between them. Such a
system is currently in operation in Michigan." Statistics on the result
of the Michigan program are still somewhat inconclusive since it has
only been in operation for five years and since only recently has the
number of claims begun to accelerate. It can be noted, however, that
between January 1, 1976 and September 30, 1980, thirty percent of all
claims filed had been resolved and more than twice as many claims had
been settled as were tried to a panel. Probably the biggest advantage
259. See notes 87-108 and accompanying text supra.
260. See notes 109-120 and accompanying text supra.
261. See notes 121-124 and accompanying text supra.
262. See notes 127-128 and accompanying text supra.
263. See generally text at section IV supra.
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to a system such as Michigan's is that-because the system is one of
voluntary, binding arbitration-cases may be appealed to the courts
only in rare instances. Obviously, then, the malpractice burden on the
courts would be almost eliminated through the use of such a system.
Equally important, however, would be the incentive, or at least lack of
disincentive, on the parts of the claimants and health care providers to
pursue settlement negotiations. Under a system of binding arbitration,
there would be no reason for the parties to delay settlement talks until
receiving the decision of the panel. Unlike the situation of nonbinding
arbitration or medical panel review, the parties cannot hope to parlay
a favorable board decision into a bigger settlement. In a system of
binding arbitration, the parties take what they receive.
A final alternative to traditional malpractice litigation is the medical
review panel system and in looking at review panel systems the
legislature would have a great variety from which to choose. Such a
system is in operation in Tennessee and appears to be working
relatively well."4 In the five years in which the system has been in
operation, the review panels have disposed of more than eighty-seven
percent of the cases filed. Thi settlement rate, however, has not been
high-eleven percent-and there is some indication that at least a
third of the cases decided by a panel are then pursued through the
courts. A medical review panel also exists in New York.265 There, not
only is the in-panel settlement rate low-nine percent-but also set-
tlements reached following panel decisions are substantially higher
than those reached subsequent to traditional pretrial conferences. Fur-
thermore, the panel system actually represents not an alternative to
civil litigation but in many instances merely a prerequisite to litigation
requiring additional expenditures of time, money, and energy by the
parties, their counsel, and the legal system. It has been recommended
by the Ad Hoc Committee studying the New York system that medical
review panels be abolished and be replaced by an optional mediation
system.
No system which a state adopts as an alternative to malpractice
litigation will be perfect. Any will take a great deal of organizational
and administrative effort by state officials which must then be followed
by cooperation from the parties and their counsel. On the whole,
however, it appears that the system most likely to achieve the results
sought in an alternative to malpractice litigation -dispute resolution
which is relatively quick and fair to the parties and nonburdensome to
the courts-is voluntary binding arbitration. Such a system would not
be immune to challenge, however. Legislation establishing such a
264. See notes 194-239 and accompanying text supra.
265. See notes 240-253 and accompanying text supra.
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system must go to great lengths to insure that patients entering into
such agreements understand what they are doing, that the contracts
they sign are not contracts of adhesion, that health care providers
cooperate by offering to enter such agreements with patients and, that
the arbitration system really does operate quickly and fairly for all
parties. The Michigan legislation and the Michigan system offer ex-
amples, however, which should be instructive for any legislature seek-
ing a viable alternative to traditional medical malpractice litigation.26
It is certainly worthy of consideration in Pennsylvania.
266. See generally text at section IV supra.

